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Introduction  
 
Terrorism, like other forms of crime, rarely serves as a career choice, decreasing 
sharply with age (LaFree & Ackerman, 2009; Gottfredson & Hirschi, 1986). The individual 
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Abstract 
Various researchers have developed the push-pull model (Aho, 1988; Altier, 
Thoroughgood, & Horgan, 2014; Altier, Boyle, Shortland, & Horgan, 2017; 
Bjorgo 2009). Others have completed research on factors of disengagement 
(Barrelle, 2014; Gill, Bouhana, & Morrison, 2015). The studies aggregate data 
from either individual testimonies or group analyses into a broad pool of factors in 
order to create a universal theory. This paper argues that rather than trying to view 
all terrorist organizations as having commonalities, the push-pull model can 
provide a unique perspective of how each group is dissimilar. Each organization 
has a distinctive pattern of disengagement that aligns with its context. Of 
particular interest is the positive or negative orientation of members toward their 
former community. The data from four studies of disengagement from different 
terrorist organizations also provide a meso-level view to validate the push-pull 
model, allowing for a comparative analysis of whether some factors occur more 
frequently or do not appear in specific groups as well as whether some factors are 
missing from the model. A future counterterrorism application of this paper would 
be to carry out push-pull analyses of terrorist organizations in order to create a 
convincing strategy tailored by organization that will encourage members to 
voluntarily leave. 
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faces a clandestine life, death, arrest, or disengagement - briefly bearable, but tough to aspire 
to long-term. Some terrorists may defect independently in the midst of the struggle; 
meanwhile, terrorist groups can also fold in on themselves in situations of “organizational 
decline” (Horgan, 2009b). When the end of the conflict appears imminent, the rate of 
disengagement may increase.  
 
Figure 1: Deradicalization and Disengagement Continuum for Terror Organizations 
 
Deradicalization denotes an individual separating from an extremist ideology whereas 
disengagement refers to a cessation of terrorist behavior (Horgan, 2009a). Not everyone who 
joins a terrorist group is radicalized; it is possible to join solely for financial reasons, for 
example. Likewise, not everyone who is radicalized joins a terrorist group. Similarly, 
someone may deradicalize without leaving a violent extremist organization or also disengage 
without deradicalizing. Disengagement without deradicalization may be the minimum goal of 
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counterterrorism - stopping the physical strife. However, therein lies the risk of the 
disengaged radical resuming the fight at some point in the future. The very literature of the 
push-pull model witnesses that in that the paper originating the model (Aho, 1988) included a 
case study of one Greg Withrow who, while disengaged in 1988, later returned to white 
supremacy (Southern Poverty Law Center, 2005).  
A number of studies have addressed disengagement from individual organizations 
(Alonso, 2011; Chernov Hwang, 2017; Della Porta, 2009; Ferguson, Burgess, & Hollywood, 
2015; Ferguson, 2016; Lopez-Alves, 1989; Moghadam, 2012; Neumann, 2015; Reinares, 
2011; van der Heide & Huurman, 2016). Additionally, scholarly works have focused on 
creating a theory of disengagement (Aho, 1988; Altier, Thoroughgood, & Horgan, 2014; 
Barrelle, 2014: Bjorgo & Horgan, 2009; Bjorgo, 2011; Crenshaw, 1991; Cronin, 2009; 
Horgan, 2009a; Horgan, 2009b; Horgan, 2014; Windisch, Simi, Ligon & McNeel, 2016). 
Aho (1988) originated a push-pull model of disengagement, theorizing that some 
factors like poor leadership push an individual out of the group while other factors pull him or 
her out, such as a wish to start a family. Altier et al. (2014) enumerated a list of factors based 
on Bjorgo (2009). Some group studies have specifically listed push and pull aspects (Chernov 
Hwang, 2017; Ferguson, 2016; van der Heide & Huurman, 2016). Altier, Boyle, Shortland, 
and Horgan (2017) completed a quantitative analysis of 87 defector accounts for push and 
pull factors, concluding that push factors more frequently figured in disengagement.  
Altier et al. (2017) used individual data of disengagement to create macro-level 
conclusions about the weight of factors. While Alonso (2009) analyzed counterterrorism 
efforts against ETA and the IRA, Disley, Weed, Reding, Clutterback and Warnes (2011) 
along with Gill, Bouhana, and Morrison (2015) have compared causes for disengagement 
among groups. Interestingly, many studies in disengagement include data from other sources 
such as former members of new religious movements and gangs. This may be useful in that 
the field of terrorism study has traditionally lacked data, but many questions remain. How do 
terrorist organizations and new religious movements overlap? How are they different? Some 
terrorist organizations propagate cults of personality and radicalize their members. Similarly, 
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some cults such as the Rajneeshees or Aum Shinrikyo carried out terrorist attacks. 
Nevertheless, Lewis (2011) argues that a handful of violent cults have led to the assumption 
that all cults are violent. Likewise, Lynch (2015) questioned whether all terrorists truly 
commit violent acts or whether ceasing to engage in violence but remaining in an organization 
could be considered disengagement. That overlap of qualities of both types of organization 
can be explained more from the aspect of disengagement. Similarly, gang data are often 
vaguely described and the qualitative connection between terrorist organizations and gangs as 
refers to disengagement remains an area of untapped research. 
Perhaps not enough attention has been paid to Aho’s emphasis of strong social ties 
within the organization correlating negatively with desistance. Continuing the conversation, 
Harris, Gringart, and Drake (2017) suggested that organizational responses to key situations 
snowballed into defection rather than focusing on the accumulated grievances before the 
event. Both studies complement each other to support the theory of social learning theory in 
terrorism (Akers, 1973; Akers & Silverman, 2004). Vidino, Marone and Entenmann (2017) 
and Reinares, Garcia-Calvo, and Vicente (2017) all support the concept of radicalization in 
clusters. Vidino et al. state that “radicalization is a group phenomenon, which takes place 
among small clusters of individuals who influence and support each other.” The Spanish data 
from Reinares et al. verified that 68.7 percent of Spanish jihadis arrested between 2013 and 
2016 were radicalized by an individual with whom they had a pre-existing social bond. If 
social ties are so important for radicalization, perhaps as Rabasa, Pettyjohn, Ghez, and 
Boucek (2010) intimate, some terrorists may also leave in clusters.  
This study occurs on the meso level by analyzing group-level data and then comparing 
results between groups. The individual-level studies that have already been done are 
important because they gather universal trends searching for commonalities; meanwhile, a 
meso analysis is more qualitative, allowing for a counterterrorism strategy by group. One 
value of that is a validation of the push-pull model, if different aspects factor more heavily in 
different groups, or if a specific consideration in particular re-occurs. Furthermore, it allows 
for a review of Altier et al. (2014) to see if any factors are missing or unnecessary. This paper 
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hypothesizes that while Altier et al. (2014) have developed the basic push-pull factors, there 
might be room to re-consider the individual factors of the model or add to them. Actually, 
Altier et al. (2017) title the list of push-pull factors as “hypothesized,” implying that scholarly 
conversation is welcome. However, the key takeaway is the counterterrorism application 
could follow from understanding the predominant signature of an organization to construct 
propaganda or a psychological operation to question the organization at its core using the 
weak points its own members criticize.  
 
 
Figure 2: Factors for Terrorist Disengagement (Altier et al., 2014)  
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Methods 
 
This paper addresses voluntary departure from terrorist groups and how different 
groups compare when using the push-pull model. In order to do so, a search for relevant 
articles was carried out using the university library search engine, Google Scholar and 
citations in papers on disengagement. One particular aid was Appendix A of Windisch, et al. 
(2016), a list of articles focusing on “ideologically-based and violent organizations.” Since 
this study only included papers on terrorism, those on gangs and new religious movements 
were excluded. If the paper considered multiple groups at the same time, it was only used if 
the data included small groups with a similar ideology (e.g., Loyalist groups, Indonesian 
jihadi groups). If only one or two subjects were interviewed, the study was considered too 
small to compare for this paper. That means that autobiographical narratives were not 
included. In order to be included, the study had to provide reasons why the terrorists left the 
organization. Disengagement and deradicalization do not necessarily co-occur (Horgan, 
2009a), and so papers focusing on deradicalization but not disengagement were excluded. If 
the paper centered on a deradicalization or disengagement program but did not include factors 
for leaving, it did not have enough data for this paper. Fifty-two papers or books that broadly 
fit the criteria of having or being likely to have some group-specific data that could be coded 
using push-pull factors with some explanation as to source of the data and the number of 
participants can be found in Appendix A. All meet the general criteria of discussing 
disengagement from terrorism, but many did not meet the more rigorous requirement in order 
to code the responses.  
Four representative studies were selected using those criteria: Chernov Hwang (2017), 
Ferguson et al. (2015), Reinares (2011), and van der Heide and Huurman (2016). There are 
others that fit the criteria, so this study could and should be enlarged in the future. One of 
those is Moghadam (2012), which also has a quantitative analysis of each factor as evidenced 
in different generations of the Red Army Faction. Alonso (2011) was not included in this 
study because Reinares (2011) already considered ETA. A qualitative study was preferable in 
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this situation to using every possible study since the primary goal of this paper is to highlight 
the unique profiles of each group and how that presents a counterterrorism pathway.  
Two of the studies already included a push-pull analysis done by the authors (Chernov 
Hwang, 2017; van der Heide and Huurman, 2016), and one was completed for both Reinares 
(2011) and Ferguson et al. (2015). Each analysis consisted of reviewing the paper to see 
whether the factors for leaving fell into existing push or pull factors. Any reasons for 
disengagement that fell outside Altier et al.’s list were tentatively placed into push or pull 
categories and marked as possible new factors. Furthermore, each factor was considered on a 
chart so that it was easy to tell which factors occurred in that organizational study and which 
ones did not. Since only some of the studies quantified their results, this analysis only 
reported the presence of the factor rather than how frequently it occurred. Finally, the results 
were compiled into a comprehensive table in order to see which factors occurred most often 
over all groups and which ones did not occur. 
 
Analysis 
 
Altogether, the studies comprise 123 participants. Only two indicate the period of 
disengagement. The ETA members left between 1970 and 2000, and the Islamic State 
followers abandoned the group between 2014 and 2015. The Red Hand Commando was 
established in 1972 and the Ulster Volunteer Force before that in 1966. The two organizations 
established a disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) program on May 3, 
2007. Therefore, the Loyalist defections must have occurred anywhere from 1966-2007. 
Jemaah Islamiyah and the other affiliated Indonesian organizations were part of Darul Islam 
until 1993; thus, the 50 former Indonesian terrorists must have left between 1993 and 2014. 
Three of the authors interviewed their participants while van der Heide and Huurman 
used Neumann’s (2015) data. Van der Heide and Huurman coded Neumann’s cases into push-
pull factors, which is why that study was used rather than Neumann. The interviews occurred 
over a range of time from 2006 to 2015, with some possibly as early as 1970, and Neumann’s 
defector narratives were gathered in 2015 from public sources. Since these studies are based 
  
 
 
 
 
Marita La Palm: Re-Purposing the Push-Pull Model 
 
 
 
 
92 
upon self-reported information, it is important to note that people aren’t always the most 
objective about their own behavior, and so these results must be tempered with that 
understanding. A psychological scale might allow for a more quantitative study. 
 
Figure 3: Overview of the Studies 
 
1. Northern Ireland 
Ferguson et al. (2015) interviewed 11 members of two Northern Irish Loyalist groups 
- the Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF) and Red Hand Commando (RHC). Nine of the 11 
interviewees had served prison sentences of at least five years. The authors encountered the 
individuals by using community organizations to invite participation. The interviews were 
completed from 2006-2009 while the group was in process of disarming. 
For this reason, the main push factor was not frustration with the organization, but the 
power of “transformative leadership” encouraging the members to stop the struggle. In that 
sense, disengagement was somewhat involuntary. 
However, there were no other push factors listed in the study and that should be of 
note. It is important to ask whether there were minimal pull factors due to the organizations 
treating their members well or whether the encouragement to leave the groups led to members 
viewing it in a more idealistic fashion. It is somewhat paradoxical, but the fact that a group 
kills people does not mean it treats its members poorly. Furthermore, one might expect that 
individuals joining a terrorist organization don’t have particularly high expectations, 
especially in the material realm. 
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Figure 4: Northern Irish Push-Pull Factors 
 
Interestingly, Shapiro (2015) reported from “An Index of Deaths from the Conflict in 
Northern Ireland” by Malcolm Sutton that the Loyalist forces killed 85.6 percent civilian 
victims as compared to their enemy, the Irish Republican Army (IRA), which only had a 35.9 
percent civilian death toll. Nevertheless, most of the Loyalist casualties were Catholic, so that 
might have influenced their judgment. Still, 61.9 percent of all combatants killed by the 
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Loyalists were their own men. This analysis suggests that those members Ferguson 
interviewed might have been from the central core of the organization who believed in it 
without question (although not necessarily the upper echelons). In that sense, his study has 
answered the question of what can make the most committed members leave. This study 
might have particular utility when considering how to vacate the core of a terrorist 
organization. 
An alternative hypothesis came from Lynch (2015), who confirmed that Northern Irish 
combatants might have disengaged but they did not deradicalize. That lends some explanation 
to the continuance of the Dissident Irish Republicans and Loyalist organizations to this day, 
albeit at a much lower level of violence than previously.  
Three new pull factors contributed to their exit - “life changes,” including getting 
older and “family responsibilities;” “finding space to think” as a result of leaving the country 
or going to prison; and a desire to build a joint society. Three pull factors were already in 
Altier et al.’s list, - “positive interactions with moderates,” “employment/education demands 
or opportunities,” and the “desire to marry/establish a family or family demands.” The 
uniqueness of the situation in which the leaders wished to desist resulted in a focus on pull 
factors as there was no need to justify leaving the organization. 
One of the most salient pull factors described by Ferguson et al. is the influence of 
“time to think,” including time in prison. Aho (1988) aptly labels that “metanoia.” Although 
Ferguson et al. focused on the transformation occurring during that time, it is also interesting 
to think about the passage of time as moving an individual further along the age-crime 
continuum (Hirschi & Gottfredson, 1983). Perhaps disengagement does not depend upon a 
change, but rather time itself. This suggests a theory of deterrence might be meaningful when 
dealing with extremists. 
Ferguson et al. also highlighted negative factors that encourage individuals to stay 
within their organization. Any strategy must also be capable of assessing why recruits remain, 
and not just from an outsider’s perspective. 
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Overall, none of the push and three of the pull factors found validation in Ferguson et 
al. Three new pull factors and one new push factor appeared. The new factors appeared quite 
important: the push factor in the absence of the existing factors and the pull factors in the 
strength of the time to think factor. Ferguson et al. provide data that suggest that leaving a 
terrorist organization doesn’t always have to be full of anger and disappointment. In fact, with 
so little criticism of the group or the violence, there were no signs that the individuals were 
deradicalized in spite of their complete disengagement. There was no indication of 
introspection or a sense of responsibility for their connection to violence. Therefore, they 
most likely fell into the bottom right quadrant of Figure 1. Since self-awareness about the 
criminal behavior was minimal but the desire for a new life high, propaganda could have 
emphasized the benefits of their new life while avoiding sparking conflict by criticizing the 
UVF or RHC. 
 
2. ETA 
Reinares (2011) interviewed 70 individuals who had left the Basque ethnonationalist 
organization ETA over the time period of 1970-2000 and used 35 of those interviews for his 
study. 
At least one of those was a woman. Reinares also developed a questionnaire. Reinares 
explained the theme, “Until the mid-1980s, the individual decision to leave ETA tended to be 
linked to a subjective perception of ongoing political and social changes. From then on, 
disagreement with the internal functioning of the ethno-nationalist terrorist organization or the 
tactics adopted by its leaders became more salient motivations for those militants who decided 
to walk away.” 
The ETA members felt strong push factors to leave the organization. Since Franco’s 
death, Spain had become more democratic, and that meant their struggle no longer felt so 
necessary and the Basque population cooled in its support. The leadership did not inspire 
confidence in its members either. The members had “unmet expectations,” disillusionment, 
questioned bloody attacks, and were upset at “ironclad control.” They believed that level of 
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violence was not required. Not only did the violence alienate the community, but also the 
extremists. The new push factors were less social support from the surrounding community as 
well as a belief that the organization must end. 
 
Figure 5: ETA Push-Pull Factors 
 
There was really only one factor that did not reflect negatively on ETA, the pull factor 
of having a family. There were three new pull factors, and in general they emphasized the 
negative about the group as well: fear, boredom, and having a spiritual experience. 
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It appears that the members felt ETA should have disarmed much before it did on 
April 8, 2017. If the 1985-2000 period included dissatisfaction with ETA, the group had long-
term unity concerns. The push-pull model appeared to be verified in Reinares (2011), but 
there were also some new factors. However, what most stands out is the negative aspect of the 
responses, which actually is not something measured by the push-pull model. That indicates 
that there had been an opportunity window in which - although currently in 2017 they have 
officially disengaged as an organization - ETA members had been deradicalized but not 
disengaged due to loyalty. Since the overwhelming sentiment was against the organization, a 
counterterrorist strategy should be highly critical of ETA and in particular its unnecessary use 
of violence. Offering opportunities to get away, especially out of the country would have 
likely been productive.  
 
3. Indonesian Jihad 
The data for Chernov Hwang’s study come from the interviews of 50 former jihadis 
belonging to Jemaah Islamiyah, its affiliate Tanah Runtuh, Mujahidin KOMPAK, its affiliate 
Mujahidin Kayamanya, and Ring Banten. Chernov Hwang highlighted an important aspect to 
deradicalization in Indonesia: some individuals left independently and at the same time, the 
group itself became increasingly less violent. Is disengagement a process that occurs naturally 
across all groups (even if it takes longer for some organizations than others)? Regardless, the 
Indonesian jihadi groups have always been somewhat autonomous in that although they 
assisted Bin Laden and received training in Afghanistan, according to Chernov Hwang, they 
preferred to fight their local foes rather than Bin Laden’s global enemies. 
Chernov Hwang elaborated eight factors of disengagement, which had considerable 
overlap with Altier et al. (2014). Her work is also unique in that she has quantitative data for 
how many former mujahideen responded affirmatively to each question. The primary reasons 
for disengagement were “disillusionment with tactics; new friendships and relationships; 
changing priorities, and cost benefit analysis.” The push factors were disillusionment and 
disenchantment, “inability to cope with violence,” and a “loss of faith in ideology.” 
  
 
 
 
 
Marita La Palm: Re-Purposing the Push-Pull Model 
 
 
 
 
98 
 
Figure 6: Indonesian Jihadi Push-Pull Factors 
 
Two new factors were the “cost benefit analysis” and a belief that the violence was no longer 
necessary. In general, the disillusionment/disenchantment category from Chernov Hwang is 
too broad; Altier et al.’s breakdown seems clearer. Chernov Hwang’s pull factors included 
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establishing relationships outside the group, “changing personal and professional priorities,” 
“humane treatment from the authorities,” and family pressures. Although not listed in 
Chernov Hwang’s factor list, she described the jihadis realizing that time in prison allowed 
them to reflect, similar to Ferguson and Reinares. The reappearance of this new factor across 
multiple groups indicates it should be added to the factors. Gill et al. (2015) also listed that 
factor, calling it “change of environment.” Lastly, one of Chernov Hwang’s conclusions is 
that not one factor is key, but the accumulation of the factors together is part of the process of 
disengagement. These results support that, but with the caveat that each group possesses a 
different disengagement profile. Identifying that is key to counterterrorism. 
The Indonesian jihadis presented broadly across the spectrum of disengagement. 
Deradicalization was not necessary and for some disengagement only meant refraining from 
terror but still partaking in the work of the organization. In that sense, the Indonesian jihadis 
might have been spread across Figure 1, but there is a trend towards the lower half of the 
graph in spite of a common scholarly belief in the need for deradicalization. Atran’s (2010) 
visit to Indonesia where his own disengaged guide indicated his willingness to kill others and 
his ability to maintain his jihadi ideology while partaking in society support that. The current 
precarious state of Southeast Asia in which the Islamic State has achieved major footholds in 
recruitment are not reassuring as to the success of such a compromise. The best way to reach 
the Indonesian jihadis would lie in reminding them of the family lives they are missing out on 
and that the organization is not being effective with its tactics. Because former jihadis have 
spoken positively of the government’s treatment of them, continuing or increasing such 
programs should be a priority; it’s not very often that former terrorists have positive feedback 
for their government.  
 
4. Islamic State 
Van der Heide and Huurman (2016) analyzed 27 cases of Islamic State disengagement 
narratives gathered by Neumann (2015) of ISIS defectors from 2011 onward. Five of the 27 
were women. Their reasons for leaving were coded by factor or Laub and Sampson’s (2001) 
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life transitions. This was helpful in that they provided quantitative data for frequency, noting 
that the number one reason for disengagement was that “life under ISIS...turned out to be very 
different than what the formers expected.” In spite of the violent propaganda, many people 
arriving in the Islamic State felt disappointed that it was a violent and cruel place. Van der 
Heide and Huurman’s sample was mixed foreign fighters and local Syrians, some who had 
come specifically to fight Assad. The violence does take a toll because an inability to adjust to 
the violence led many in the sample to leave. The defectors concluded that the Islamic State 
was not being faithful to Islam.  
 The fact that two of the studies involve jihadist groups is no accident - LaFree and 
Ackerman (2009) documented some demographical differences in jihadi recruits - they were 
older and more likely to be married than the average terrorist. At least in terms of recruitment, 
their study has always seemed to contradict Laub and Sampson’s (2001) life course theory. 
Previously marriage had been considered a factor related to decreased crime. This is one of 
the criminological mysteries of the study of terrorism. While van der Heide and Huurman’s 
data support the failure of the aging and marriage desistance theory in jihadis, some of Laub 
and Sampson’s pull factors do appear such as important family events and the decision to go 
straight. 
The Islamic State defectors had very critical things to say in the push categories. They 
were quite unhappy with their group. They didn’t see Islamic State providing humanitarian 
aid, some who wanted to fight weren’t allowed to fight, and the reality of the group was much 
different than expected. Then it gets darker - the combatants resented being involved in 
killings of other jihadis and Assad supporters. Some were angered by rapes and executions. 
Their friends were killed. They saw the group as barbaric and thug-like. The former members 
saw the Islamic State as corrupt and cruel. They described it as having “nothing to do with 
Islam.” There were no new push factors in van der Heide and Huurman, but the factors that 
were present substantially validated Altier et al.’s factors. 
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Figure 7: Islamic State Push-Pull Factors 
 
The pull factors were also notably negative. Some felt the group was too violent or 
saw their own family members get killed. Another felt horrified by his or her actions. 
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Homesickness as well as horror at one’s own actions and at a family member’s death were the 
three new factors added to Altier et al. 
 The organizational profile of former Islamic State members exactly matches that of 
ETA - entirely negative, with nothing positive at all. The members have fully deradicalized if 
they were ever radicalized and they have completely left the organization. As van der Heide 
and Huurman note, leaving the Islamic State is often a life or death matter, so the individuals 
willing to publicly reveal information have been among the lucky ones to escape. Speckhard 
and Yayla (2016) interviewed Islamic State defectors and documented even more disturbing 
tales than are present in van der Heide and Huurman. One example is the teenage boy who 
described how other boys were sent in vehicles rigged with explosives without their 
knowledge and someone outside the vehicle detonated the switch. While the other studies had 
members who defected after much time to themselves, the Islamic State is still so young of an 
organization (if we ignore the years of Al Qaeda in Iraq) that while there have been a number 
imprisoned, they have not had sufficient time to reflect and disengage. Recently, many are 
being sent to prison in Iraq since the fall of Mosul and fighters for the Islamic State have been 
arrested upon returning to their home countries. If we include Al Qaeda in Iraq, we find that 
Abu Bakr al Baghdadi himself was imprisoned along with other radicals and that brought him 
on a path far from disengagement. That leads to a much more complex conversation about 
prison and radicalization as well as prison and torture. Regardless, any propaganda strategy 
against the Islamic State should target its lack of faithfulness to Islam and its hypocrisy to its 
own ideology. Its rapid increase in territory led to a massive influx in combatants, but also the 
speedy loss of land has resulted in many of the locals fleeing with foreign fighters being 
trapped due to their obviously foreign appearance and dying in the fight. While complaining 
about their violence may feel hopeless, that complaint deeply resonated within former ISIS 
terrorists.  
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Figure 8: Overall Factor View 
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Results  
 
The results of all four analyses are combined into Figure 8 for clarity of overview. 
Defectors of three out of four groups had unmet expectations and also disillusionment with 
personnel and strategies or tactics of the group. This suggests that disappointment is one of 
the strongest emotions linked to leaving a terrorist organization. None of the studies reported 
difficulty adjusting to the clandestine lifestyle. However, many of the pull factors relate to 
parts of life sacrificed in a life hiding from the law. The same three groups also had defectors 
who had difficulty adjusting to the life of violence. Likewise, their former members suffered a 
loss of faith in the ideology. Nevertheless, burnout was not listed as a factor for leaving any of 
the four groups. Still, it appears the Islamic State and ETA members felt burnout even if it 
was not mentioned. Their emotions towards their groups indicate that. In terms of pull factors, 
competing loyalties occurred one time and positive interactions with moderates two times. 
Employment and education had two occurrences while family had three. Financial incentives 
did not appear in these four studies; amnesty did once. Fourteen possible new factors have 
been identified. The new push factors were transformative leadership, less social support, the 
inevitable end of the group, a “cost benefit analysis,” (Chernov Hwang, 2015) and the 
realization that the violence was unnecessary. The new pull factors were getting older, finding 
space to think, fear, boredom, spiritual experiences, family members killed by the group, 
being shocked by one’s own actions and being homesick. Time for reflection in prison 
occurred twice. 
To summarize, most of the factors from Altier et al. were validated. Some, however, 
did not appear in any of the four studies. Further research is needed to see if they would show 
up in a broader sample of groups. It is likely that they would since Altier et al.’s factors came 
from similar studies. A number of possible new factors arose. Of special interest was the 
repeated idea of cognitive opening resulting from time in prison, out of the country, and 
becoming aware of fear, boredom or spirituality. 
In conclusion, a cross-organizational analysis has been completed. It is clear that 
situational factors are key aspects of disengagement. If a group’s violence is less acceptable 
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due to changing political conditions or decreasing social acceptance, this will have an effect 
on retention. In spite of the stereotype of the unfeeling terrorist, the narratives and interviews 
reveal individuals troubled by excessive violence. Moral disengagement is finite. 
Each group presented with a clear profile or pattern. The push factors were most 
common across all groups. One could almost say that terrorist disengagement follows a 
certain Maslow’s hierarchy of needs. If life in the group is so miserable that it cannot be 
tolerated, the individual will not focus on a new life or their dreams. In the case of Islamic 
State defectors, their primary goal will be surviving to tomorrow. The Islamic State and ETA 
defectors had a very similar pattern of responses. The Indonesian groups had a mixed push-
pull profile, and the Loyalist groups fell into the pull categories. When the responses are 
predominantly push, the general tone is overall negative. A mostly pull profile might be 
expected to be more positive in view of the organization and more hopeful of a better life. 
Members of a group such as ETA or the Islamic State have at least minimally deradicalized 
themselves whereas the Loyalist members didn’t show any signs of insight. 
LaFree and Ackerman (2009) demonstrated that Islamist terrorism does not follow 
typical crime demographics, and this review of disengagement from Islamist groups shows 
that the Islamic State is furthest from the norm in responsiveness to those push factors while 
the Loyalist groups were heavily affected by pull factors. For counterterrorism purposes, push 
factors, such as weak leadership and dissatisfaction with the group appear to be the most 
universal. Both Altier et al. (2017) and van der Heide and Huurman (2016) support this policy 
application. Identifying the unique push factors to an organization is key to propaganda. For 
example, the Islamic State has long violated the norms of violence even for Al Qaeda, leading 
to condemnation (McCants, 2015). ETA also had considerable dissent among its members. A 
broad propaganda strategy could attack that weak point and it could also be used for 
individual intelligence recruitment or even to simply encourage members to leave. Although 
ETA and the Loyalist groups have disarmed, Indonesian terror groups and the Islamic State 
continue their fight. Identifying a signature pattern of disengagement and the most susceptible 
areas of criticism - not what a typical person would criticize, but a terrorist inside the group - 
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makes it easy to create a plan of action to challenge a group’s propaganda and work to extract 
members.   
 
Limitations 
 
There are some key limitations to this work. The study is qualitative and does not have 
statistical significance. Since half of the authors coded their own studies, coding is not 
standardized. There is clearly some missing data due to the small sample of groups. For 
example, amnesty was an important factor for Italian terrorists (Della Porta, 2009), but it does 
not receive emphasis in the other four studies. Another major limitation is that two of the 
studies (Reinares, 2011; Ferguson et al., 2015) have figured prominently in other research 
such as Gill et al. (2015) and so it is hard for this to be a full validation. Reinares (2011) was 
one of the studies used to create the factors by Altier et al. (2014). Therefore, it is not a 
reliable validator in the sense the preliminary data cannot be reused to validate the model 
because it will simply validate that it is already present. However, Reinares (2011) is a good 
exemplar of how push-pull factors can create an organizational signature. 
 
Directions for Future Research 
Opportunities for future study abound. It would be useful to perform a larger study of 
disengagement literature, especially among groups. Coding push-pull factors in paired studies 
of the same group might be interesting. For example, Alonso (2011) and Reinares (2011) 
could be compared to verify group disengagement signatures. Altier et al. (2017) could be 
varied by taking the 87 autobiographical accounts and seeing if the individual data is reliable 
across each group, and if not, why not. Quantitative data concerning the strength of each 
factor in a group or for each individual would be very helpful such as what can be found in 
Altier et al. (2017). 
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Furthermore, the nodes of connectivity between gangs, new religious movements and 
terrorist organizations deserve additional study. One possible aspect of that is how moral 
disengagement differs in terrorist organizations and new religious movements.  
Numerous questions center on the disengagement process and deradicalization. Do 
terrorists disengage more often individually, en masse, or in clusters? The patterns of 
disengagement have not been fully researched. Do the most committed terrorists leave later 
than the less socially connected? How does the positive or negative view of the defector relate 
to deradicalization or previous commitment? How does it correlate with the group score on 
measures of thought control or abusiveness? What other groups besides the Northern Irish 
Loyalist groups are particularly prone to low deradicalization and a positive view of the 
organization even after leaving? Does the push-pull model serve as a continuum of positive or 
negative experiences or are most experiences mixed along push-pull lines? How can the new 
factor of finding time to think be applied meaningfully to counterterrorism? 
However, the principal research opportunity from this study is that, ideally, it could be 
expanded by performing standardized individual interviews of significant numbers of 
disengaged terrorists by group across multiple groups, analyzing that data statistically so as to 
create occurrence rates for each factor and any new factors, and then describing in-depth 
signature patterns by organization. These patterns could lay the groundwork for 
disengagement initiatives for counterterrorism. There is room for expansion of those 
recommendations and the creation of detailed psychological operations.  
 The push-pull model is a useful tool in analyzing terrorist organizations into universal 
factors and also by group. For the most part, its current factors withstand review. Certainly, 
more factors deserve consideration as well. Every organization has a weak point that can be 
exploited to encourage disengagement; not every organization has the same vulnerability or 
strength. Terrorist organizations by their very etymology are frightening monoliths. Yet, 
secretly terrorists may be dissatisfied and in the long run leave terrorist organizations 
disappointed. 
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